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A familiar complaint against General Equilibrium theory is 
that i,t is unrealistic or bears insufficient relation to economic· 
reality. This sort of charge, however, is of questionable value, 
since all theories are to an extent unrealistic, and since crite-
ria for sufficient theoretical approximation of reality appear 
unavailable. Indeed, recent preoccupation a.Qng methodologists 
with the Kuhn-type concern that the competition among parad~qms 
may be inherently irresolvable suggests that the idea of a theory's 
approximation of reality might be either incoherent or at best 
w~thout practical implication. This post-Kant ian vie~, that is, 
accepts the proposition that theory largely dictates the very 
character of reality, such that adjudication between incommensur-
able well-developed theories .is all but impossible. 
In this paper, it is maintained that the complacency with 
which these conclusions are defended derives from an uncritical 
acceptance of the traditional analysis of reference implicit in 
the post-Kantian philosophical tradition. That since the early 
1970s this traditional theory has been subjected to powerful 
criticism by a number of philosophers, moreover, suggests that it 
is no longer reasonable to ignore the question of sufficient 
theoretical approximation of reality. Finally, should truth 
indeed be determined paradigmatically, that is; ' within the con-
text of a theory, then whether a theory can be .aid to actually 
pick out objects in the world that are naaed within the theory 
becomes a matter of pre-eminent impOrtance. 
The question fo~ General Equilibrium theory, then, is not 
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whether it bears insufficient relation to economic reality, but 
rather whether it possesses a coherent and systematic analysis 
of reference, that is, an analysis that allows the theory to 
coherently and systematically pick out objects in the world which 
are named within the theory. Should, in resistance to the posing 
of this question, it be claimed by General Equilibrium theorists 
that such a matter is extra-economic and essentially philosophic, 
two responses are in order. First, since virtually everyone 
would deny that General Equilibrium theory bears no relation to 
economic reality whatsoever, it must bear some such relation, 
and thus at least implicitly presupposes some analysis of refer-
ence which is accordingly subject to examination. Second, as 
will be argued below, the axiomatic character of General Equilib-
rium theory reveals this implicit analysis to be very much a form 
of the traditional view of reference recently subjected to im-
portant criticism. First, then, what is the traditional view of 
reference? 
1 ' The traditional view of reference utilizes the Kantian 
distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments2 to establish 
how and when a name (common noun or proper name) successfully 
picks out the object in the world to which it is meant to refer. 
In particular, the traditional view explains the meaning of a 
name, or the concept of the object in question, in terms of the 
properties analytically true of the name and thus essential or 
necessary to ~he object n~ed. In the words of one of the fore-
most critics of this conception: 
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On the traditional view, the meaninq of 
say, "lemon," is given by specifyin~ a 
conjunction of properties. For each of 
these properties, the statement "lemons 
have the property P" is an analytic truth~ 
and if PI' P2 , · •... Pn are all of the 
properties in the conjunction, then -any-
thing with ' all of the properties PI' • 
P
n 
is a lemon" is likewise an analytic 
truth (Putnam, 1970, 51). 
The conjunction of properties associated with a name is generally
called the intension of . the name. _ The extension 6f the name, 
on the other hand, is represented by the object or , objects the' 
name picks out. ,While some versions of the theory argue that 
proper application of a name allows for less than the full con-
junction of properties analytically true of that name--a 'cluster
of properties3--in all other respects the relationship between 
the intension and extension of a name -is preserved. On this 
view, then, the intension of a name determines its extension, or,
simply, meaning determines reference. 
Thus, whereas Kant had claimed that knowledge of the world 
is structured by the character of the human mi~, the traditional
view of reference requires that the meanings inherent in lan,guage 
dictate what can be picked out in the world. Kant's account in 
terms of judgments and concepts pos.es.es an unnecessarily 
psychological flavor from the modern point of view, and moreover, 
his treatment of judgment appears ambiguous between the act of 
judging and what is judged. If" however, his ~nalysis is 
restricted to an 'account of what is judged, namely, propositions 
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or statements, the psychological character of concepts or mean-
ings is replaced by their propositional or linguistic character. 
The traditional view of reference, then, is essentially consistent 
with the Kantian approach in that it characterizes a system of 
representation, linguistic rather than psychological, in terms 
that permit identification of that about which certainty is 
possible, namely, analytical truths about concepts and -their 
properties. In contrast, the new view of reference,4 which has 
emerged through recent critique of the traditional view, main- -
tains that there are necessary truths about objects in the world 
that are not known in virtue of analytical truths about the con-
ceptsof those objects and their properties, and, as a matter of 
historical or acientific fact, extension, or how things come to 
be named, as often as not, determines intension, or the concept 
or meaning associated with a name. Before examining this new 
view and its critique of the traditional approach, however, it 
is important to elicit the implicit reliance of General Equilibrium 
theory upon the traditional account of reference. 
General Equilibrium theory is largely coextensive with the 
theory of value of a competitive economy. In Debreu's words, 
two problema are central to this theory and thereby constitute 
its character, they are: 
(1) the explanation of the prices of 
coanoditiea resulting from the interaction 
of t~e agents o~ a private ownership economy 
through markets, (2) the explanation of the 
role of prices in an optimal state of any 
economy (Debreu, ix). 
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Though Walras and Pareto produced solutions to these problems, 
the formal structure of General Equilibrium theOry has only 
been demonstrated relatively recently, beginning with the work 
of Wald in the 1930s in connection with the first problem, and 
continuing with the work of Koopmans after 1950 in connection 
with the second. S It is fair to say, therefore, that the proper 
form for General Equilibrium theory is the axiomatic one that 
dominates the concerns of contemporary General Equilibrium 
theorists. However, it is this axiomatic form which imposes 
the traditional theory of reference on General Equilibrium theory. 
The axiomatic method, broadly speaking, links postu"iates 
or assumptions to particular conclusions by a' chain of logical 
deductions. In General Equilibrium theory these assumptions 
concern the fundamental concepts, of the competitive economy, 
namely, commodity, price, producer, production plan, the set of 
possible production plans, consumer, consumption plan, the set 
of possible consumption plans, preferences,wealth, total resources,
the economy, a private ownership economy, equilibrium and the 
optimum (Debreu; 28, 37, SO, 74, 7S, 79, 83, 90). While attention 
to the deductive character of the analysis commonly dominates 
interest in its axiomatic formulation, from the present point of 
view, the crucial element of the method concernB the determination 
of its concepts, since it is these components', via their designa-" 
tions or names ("commodity," "price," etc.) 'that pick out or ' 
refer to actual individuals or objects in the world. Indeed, it ' 
would certainly be unpromising to question the deductive structure 
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of General gquilibrium theory in light of its extensive examina-
tion and the confidence generally invested in the laws of logic. 
In contrast, little attention has been devoted to the philosophical 
character of General Equilibrium theory concept determination and 
its impact on the referential capacity of the theory .• 
To see, then, that the formulation of concepts in General 
Equilibrium theory reflects the traditional theory of reference, 
recall that the distinctive feature of the latter, as expressed 
by Putnam, is that the properties of a concept are all analytically 
and thus a priori true of that concept ("the statement 'lemons have 
the property P' is an analytic truth"). The argument here, thus, 
is that the axiomatic character of General Equilibrium theory re-
quires that properties true of concepts be treated as analytically 
true of those concepts. It is important to emphasize that this is 
the effect rather than the intent of General Equilibrium theory, 
since the mathematical philosophy of its proponents is .specifically 
formalist (Debreu, x). Formalism derives from Kant through Hilbert, 
and asserts that the truths of mathematic are not analytic. More 
generally, formalism is the view that mathematical systems are 
essentially to be regarded as nothing but formalized systems, or 
that as systems of symbolic relations they possess their validity 
independently of any interpretation of their symbols. 6 How, then, 
are the connection. between properties and concepts to be regarded 
as analytic, or, how is it that a property ascribed to a given 
concept is par~ of the mea~ing of the latter in General Equilibrium 
theory? 
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In the first place, unlike most formalist . mathematical 
systems, ax;omatic General Equilibrium theory Goes not pretend 
to be indeterminate of application or fully independent of theorem 
interpretation. On the contrary, as noteQ above, virtually all 
General Equilibrium theorists would deny that the theory bears 
no relation whatsoever to economic reality, and mostwQuld in-
sist in fact that it does bear some such -relation. Specifically, 
in its solution to its two centr.al problems, General Equilibrium 
theory purports to characterize important features ' of a market 
economy. Yet if this is the case, then though the pr~perties 
ascribed to various concepts are not ostensibly a priori analyti~ 
cally true of those concepts, nonetheless the successful completion 
of the proofs for the existence and optimality of equilibriUm 
requires that these properties be so ,ascribed to their concepts . . 
For example, preferences must be convex in the ar9ument 
concerning consumers and demand for tbe p~oofs ultimately at 
issue to be completed. That preferences cannot but be convex 
is tantamount to saying that the concept of preferences necessarily 
includes the property of convexity--in the framework of the proofs 
at hand. Of course, were no' particular conclusion to the 'proofs 
of 'existence' and 'optimality' required, or were it just as 
reasonable to demonstrate nonexistence and/or non-optimality 'of 
a market equilibrium, then it would not be necessary that pre-
ferences be convex. In terms of formalist mathematical systems, 
as long as application or interpretation is strictly indeterminate, · 
the propositions and theorems of the analysis need not be analytic. 
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On the other band, as soon as a system is constrained to achieve 
a particular result desired from the point of view of its inter-
pretation, the relation between properties and concepts loses 
its stipulative or synthetic character. Thus if the two proofs 
of General Equilibrium theory are indeed about markets, as they 
are claimed to be, rather than simply about configurations of 
logical symbols, as formalism implies, then it is unav,oidable 
that the relation between concepts and their properties assume 
an analytic character. 7 
These conclusions are reinforced by consideration of an 
alternative type of connection between concepts and their pro-
perties. If properties of a concept are analytically ascribable 
to it, then such relations are established a priori, that is, 
apart from experience. In contrast, properties ascribed to con-
cepts a posteriori are in some fashion discovered from experience
to be so ascribable, and accordingly it cannot be said that some-
how the meaning of the concept in quest'ion includes that of the 
property ascribable to it. 
In General Equilibrium theory, then, it is hardly the case 
that, say, preferences have been discovered to be convex. In-
deed non-convex preferences, shou'ld they be observed, are con-
ventionally regarded a. a departure from rational behavior, such 
that the concept. of the consumer and preferences are necessarily
associated with convexity of preferences. Put differently, a 
. 
nonanalytic relation between a concept and its properties can 
be guaranteed by determining that relation from experience or 
9 
a posteriori, while recourse to the concept ofa rationalcon~ 
sumer by nature precludes this quarantee. 
Thus, if General .Equilibrium theory does implicitly employ 
the traditional analysis of reference, what are the problems 
with that analysis, and how do they bear on General Equilibrium 
theory itself? Recall that on the traditional view the prpperties 
true of a concept are analytically or a priori. true of that con-
cept, and the name of that concept (e.q., ·consumer" for con-
sumer) picks out or refers to those objects in the ~rld that in-
deed possess those properties. The new view of reference makes 
at least four objections to this account. 
First, that a given concept can be reasoned a priori to 
have certain properties associated with it, does not imply that 
real examples of the object des'ignated will also have those 
properties. Thus, should understanding of a concept, and there-
by the object designated by its name, change in the sense that 
new or different properties are reasoned characteristic of that 
concept and object, then the traditional view requires that an 
altoqether new or different concept and object be the subject of 
that new understanding. But in this case, there would be no 
continuity to the apparent development of understanding, since 
strictly speaking it would not be appropriate to say that the 
new understanding concerned the same concept and object ex~ined 
in the previous conception. 
More simply, the traditional view lacks a criterion of 
identity of concepts and objects across chanqes in constituting 
' 
10 
properties. This follows from its reliance upon conceptual con-
junction (or 'clusterin:J' ) of properties for the identification 
of concepts and their objects. Loosely speaking, on a more 
'realistically' oriented analysis, the world permits some con-
tinuity of objects variously conceptualized at different times 
and across theories. Though of course how this occurs is quite 
problematic, it is fair to allow that some basis for cross-
conceptualization identity of concepts and objects is crucial 
to understandin<} .and thus that it is probably mistaken to con-
fuse what is problematic with what is impossible. Moreover, if 
property characterization of concepts and objects does not it-
self provide this . criterion, it is reasonable to hypothesize that 
it is somehow 'qiven' by the world. Thus, at best, the traditional 
view is an entirely static account of concept constitution. 
General Equilibrium theory, then, in r 'elying upon the 
traditional theory of reference, is unable to identify concepts 
and objects across chanqes in their conceptualization. For ex-
ample, should consumers be found with non-convex preferences, 
that is, for some reason demonstrating an increasinq marqinal 
rate of substitution between goods, then these individuals cannot 
be characterized .a consumers within General Equilibrium theory, 
if the theory i. to continue to explain the existence and optimality 
of market equilibrium. In effect, these individuals are not 
rational, and therefore ~annot be consumers. Accordingly, 
General Equilibrium theory cannot explain consumers, but rather 
only "consumers" defined in the context of the theory, given its 
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implicit ~nalysis of reference. 8 
Second, in most cases the properties ascribed to concepts 
and objects are not a priori analytically true of those concepts 
and objects, except', perhaps, in those cases in which defini-
tions are at work. Rather, in most cases properties' ascribed to 
concepts and objects are contingently related to those concepts 
and objects as a result of scientific investigation. Put 
differently, most of what is kno~ or understood' about objects 
and their concepts has been achieved by empirical, investigation 
rather than the -analysis of meanings. That is, properties are 
ascribed to concepts a posteriori rather than a priori. Putnam 
comments on this point in the course of his general cr'itique of 
the traditional analysis. 
What has happened is this: the traditional 
theory has taken an account which ia correct 
for the ,"one criterion" concepts (Le ·., for 
such concepts as ·bachelor" and ~vixen"), ' 
and made it a general account of the meaning 
of general names. A theory which correctly 
describes the behavior of perhaps three 
hundred words has been asserted to correctly 
describe the behavior of the tens of 
thousands of gerieral names (Putnam, 1970, 
56) • 
The consequence, accordingly, is the mi.perception that a pro-
perty arguably implicit in the meaning of a concept is also 
ascribable to objects named via that concept. However, it ~ is 
a matter of practical investigation whether a property imaginably 
appropriate to ~he concept of an object is in fact appr6priat~ 
to the concept of that object. The traditional theory neglects 
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this point. 
Thus, General Equilibrium theory does not investigate 
whether, say, consumers can be said to have convex preferences. 
Indeed, from the point of view of the theory, there is no rea-
son to investigate the possibility of non-convex preferences, 
since they are precluded by the concept of the rational consumer. 
Alternatively, the only investigation the theory permits is that 
which confirms convex preferences, such that contingently 
established relationships are first and foremost a priori ones. 
More generally, the implicit adoption of the traditional analy~is 
of reference precludes empirical investigation for General 
Equilibrium theory. This conclusion, clearly, goes beyond any 
of the familiar complaints that General Equilibrium theory 'poorly' 
approximates or is 'difficult' to apply to economic reality. 
The third objection to the traditional view of reference 
is that i ':_ fails to distinguish attributive and referential 
uses of names or identifying descriptions, and that this failure 
genera'tes r'3radoxical results for the view. Donnellan is 
responsible for this distinction. 
A speaker who uses a 'd~finite description 
attributively in an assertion states some-
thing about whoever or whatever is the 
.a-and-.a. A speaker who uses a definite 
d.~riptioft referentially in an assertion, 
on the other hand, uses the description to 
enable hi. audience to pick out whom or 
what he i. talking about and states some-
thing about that person or thing (Donnellan, 
1966). . 
Significantly, a name or description used referentially may well 
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pick out an object in the world though it in ~act mislabels that 
object. "Smith's Murderer," thought to be Jones when Jones is 
actually innocent, may successfully pick out Jones in certain 
conversational contexts though mislabeling hia. The useo£" a 
label in this manner, then, does not necessarily make reference 
to whomever or whatever it apparently describes. Rather names 
or labels so used pick out objects in the. world, irrespective 
of their descriptive adequacy. In contrast, the attributive use 
of a name or label, which is the only use the traditional view 
allows, precludes saying "Smith's Murderer" without lull know-
ledge of Smith's murderer. 
Donnellan's distinction -clearly has considerable persuasive-
ness in a world of less than perfect knowledge. Should names or 
labels always pick out whatev~r or whomever they describe (the 
attributive use characteristic of the traditional view), -th,n in 
the presence of ignorance, little discussion between speakers 
would be possible. Moreover, those adopting different conceptual~~a 
tions could never claim to be intent upon establishing what might 
be known about common subject matters, and thus, science, as 
commonly understood,would itself be all but ~.sible. In _fact, 
however, conununication between tho •• adopting different character-
izations of concepts and objects is not iapo .. ible, though often 
difficult. It seems fair to say, then, thAt the failure to 
distinguish the different senses in which na.e. or descriptions 
can be used leads to a misunderstanding of the social character 
of knowledge. 
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For General Bquilibrium theory with its reliance on tradi-
tional reference, indeed, there is no incentive for communication 
with those adopting different conceptualizations of, say, the 
consumer, because the theory lacks any means of ref~rring to any-
thing but that which it captures in its own concept of the con-
Bumer. Indeed, because of its reliance on the traditional view 
of reference, the theory only jeopardizes its very existence by 
allowing that there are consumers (not ·consumers·) to discuss 
' with those of different theoretical standpoints. In contrast, 
any theoretical approach that allows for the referential use of 
names of concepts--and thus allows that the properties true of 
concepts are contingently associated with those concepts and may 
be revised--permits intertheoretical discussion of concepts such 
as that of the consumer without, at the same time, threatening 
the non-referential principles of the approach. In effect systematic 
debate between approaches is only possible in the framework of 
a posteriori concept formulation. 
The fourth objection to the traditional view of reference 
is that it excludes a comprehensive and adequate conception of 
necessary relationships. In Kripke's view, it is important to 
distinguish between necessary and a priori truths. 
What do we aean by calling a statement necessary? 
w. slaply llean that the statement in question, 
first, is true, and, second, that it could not 
have been otherwise. When we say something is 
contingently tfue, we mean that, though it is 
in ~act the case, it could have been the case 
that .things would have been otherwise. 
To the contrary, there is the notion of a priori 
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truth. An a priori truth is supposed .to be 
one which can be known to be true independently 
of all experience. Notice that this does not. 
in and of itself say anything about all possible 
worlds, unle~s this is put into the definition 
(Kripke, 1971, 136). 
Necessary truths, for Kripke, are the subject aatter. 6f meta-
physics, or the philosophy of what exi~t8, while a priori truths 
are the subject matter of epistemology. This distinction is 
important, then, because it is reasonable to believe that some 
things may be necessary irrespective of human knowledge. More-
over, on Kripke's view, that which can be known apart fro~ 
experience and that which is necessarily the case do not overlap, 
since, as he argues at length, we must discover from~he world 
what is necessarily the case, such that what is necessary is 
known to be such a posteriori. The traditional view of reference,
accordingly, not only confuses what. is knowable apart from ex-
perience with necessary relationships, but it also fails to grasp 
the genuine character of the necessary as that which must be the 
case irrespective of human cognition. 
The significance of ~hese points derives · from scientific 
concern with the question of what is essential to an object. In 
a world of change and variability across .-bars of · any category, 
success in identifying objects in .the world depends upon detec.ting
what may be considered essential to thea. Difficult as it , is to 
establish what may be considered essential to ~ny object, the 
need to identify and re-identify objects in the world makes sqme 
conception of necessary or essential properties important ·to 
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scientific reasoning. The traditional view of reference, however, 
by constituting the concept of an object via the simple con-
junction of all those properties merely a priori true of that 
concept, abandons any distinction between what must be held in-
trinsic to the concept and object and what might not be. In 
brief, the traditional view of reference is not operative in the 
scientific domain in which this distinction is central. 
In the case of the concept of the consumer in General 
Equilibriwr. theory, then, all the properties ascribable to the 
concept of the consumer are essential to that concept with the 
same a priori certainty. Indeed, the effect of abandoning any 
one of the properties of the consumer (convexity of preferences, 
transitivity of preferences, etc.) is in effect the same as 
abandoning any other, namely, the proofs of existence and 
optimality fail. Moreover, though the theory may fail in different
ways when different properties are abandoned, this tells nothing 
about which properties are crucial to the concept .of the consumer 
itself. 
Given these four objections, several points summarize the 
issues involved in the current controversy over reference. They 
concern current view. about the theory-la~enness of facts, com-
p~tition between paradigms of different economic theories, and 
the atatus of different economic paradigms. 
Firat, t~ugh it ia commonly believed that since all facts 
are theory-laden, objects in the world lack any conceptual status 
independent of the theory in which they are cognized, the dis-
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cussion above implies this inference is mistaken. Thus, 'while 
it is true that facts are theory-laden, to exaggerate the sig'nifi-
cance of this is in effect to assume that objects , in the world 
are themselves altogether constituted by conCeptualization, ,and 
thus to deny their objective character itself. This, indeed, 
is the inadvertent conclusion of the traditional theOry of 
reference, since on the principle that meaning determines - reference
or intension determines extension, the analysts of meaning tells 
us exactly what may be found in the world, and thus rules out 
the possibility that what exists may be cognitively 'nailable to 
us prior to its adequate theoretical characterization. ' 
Objects in the world, however, do posses. some conceptual 
status for us independent of or prior to any developed or theory-
determined elaboration of their properties, and it is this which 
makes science inherently empirical as well as conceptual. The 
traditional theory of reference, then, is incompatible with the 
accepted character of science, and so inimical to a scientific 
treatment of market economics. 
Second, if truth itself is arguably paradiCjlll-relative, or ' 
established as a property of the' statements within a theory, then 
the view of refer'ence adopted by a theory 1. '. crucial element 
in its evaluation. That is, if it is not pl.u.ible to say that 
the relation of a theory's statements to the world can be assessed 
in terms of the correspondence theory of ~ruth, it is all the 
more important to 'ask whether that which is named ,in the theory 
can be said to systematically and coherently pick out objects in 
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the world. A theory's analysis of reference, then, is a key 
means of judging competition between paradigms. Specifically, 
whether a yiven theory's concepts via their names can genuinely 
be said t ·> pick out the objects in the world they are meant to 
designate 6ays a great deal about the theory relative to other 
theories less successful in this regard. Indeed, if competing 
theories are equally well-developed in their chains of inference, 
it may be tha.t their respective capacities to refer to the world 
alone distinguish them. At the same time, the skepticism and 
relativism generated by Kuhn's thinking is undermined when 
differences in concept formulation in this respect are considered. 
Finally, a br~ef glance at the main idea of the new theory 
of reference provides a basis for judging the status of different 
economic paradigms. On the new view, since names are not 
descriptive summaries of concepts and their .associated properties, 
names come to have their referential function more or less 
arbitrarily from the point of view of their possi~le meaning 
elaboration. Very briefly, certain things come to be 'baptised' 
as such-and-such at certain points in history, and then, 
irrespective of future elaboration of the associated concept, 
retain their initial designation within the community of those 
investigating the concept by a sort of 'referential chain' 
(Putnam, 1973). Alternatively, once a thing is labeled with a 
particular name, althoug~ the understanding of that thing ma~ 
change; the name functions as a "rigid designator."9 
For example, though economists have very different views 
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about the concept of the vision of labor, all are mer"! or less re-
ferring to the same real world phenomenon. Indeed, though, it may 
be especially difficult ,to state in language acceptable to all just 
precisely what this ,same real world phenomenon is, that economists 
can disagree about the proper characterization of the division of 
"labor itself implies that on the whole they refer toone thing in 
, 
common. The referential capacity of different economic theories,thel
can be judged by the extent to which a theory operates ,in terms of 
concepts 'given' to the subject matter by the experience' of past 
naming, or, conversely, by the extent to which a theery generates it
I
own concepts in abstraction from those taken as common subject matte;
General Equilibrium theory stands ina questionable position on 
this score. While some of its concept$ have been taken from the ex-
perience of past naming "in economics at least , in name, its impiicit 
analysis of reference precludes those concepts from comparative 
evaluation with their formulation in other theories. Accordingly, 
the burden of proof rests upon General Equilibrium theory to demon-
strate that it is concerned with the same ,concepts that preoccupy 
other theories. Failure to demonstrate this, 'of course, suggests 
that General Equilibrium theory is extra-econoaic i~ its concerns, 
say, principally mathematical in tho •• concerns. Indeed, the argu-
ment of this paper is that the implicit theory of reference in-
escapably associated with General Equilibriua theory makes even an 
interest in comparative concept discus.ion unlikely if not 
such that pract~cally, as well as theoretically, General Equilibri 
theory is irremediably outside the mainstream of economics. 
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the .ystam, mak •• a coherent account of the referential capacity 
of the theory problematic. 
'In the T~ of Value, Debreu is at best ambiguous about 
the issues .ur~ln9 Interpretation of formalist systems. See 
his brief remark. about the dichotomy between the axiomatic form 
of the analy.is and it. interpretations (Debreu, x). 
Ssee Putnam (1970) f~r this general argument. Putnam places 
slightly more emph •• is on the question of "abnormal" members of a 
category or, as he puts it, a "natural kind." 
9This is Kripke's term. The new view do~. allow that the 
understanding of some things may change so much that they are 
re-named. However, for there to be any continuity in what a 
developing understanding of some thing is about, an object even 
to be re-named must maintain its historical tag to some extent~ 
That the process of re-naming makes it difficult to say in actual 
cases whether the same thing is at issue does not imply that the 
new view of reference is mistaken. ' 
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